公开增发稳健会计信息披露研究——一种基于信号传递模型的博弈分析  

The Optimal Disclosure of Conservatism Accounting Information

作　　者：顾鸣润[1] 田存志[1] 

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,云南昆明650093

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2012年第4期3-5,42,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：我国国民经济的持续快速增长客观要求不断壮大国内资本市场的融资功能。上市公司的公开增发作为重要的企业再融资方法之一,其本质上是一种委托代理契约。本文拟在经典契约理论的分析框架下,分析了公开增发中由于外部投资者不了解企业的利润分布,市场是否会存在分离均衡使得处于信息优势方高质量企业管理者,有激励通过向投资者传递会计信息稳健程度的信号以使其区别于低质量的企业。The rapid development of the economy creates the enlarged demand of the capital-raising capability of domestic capital market. As one of the important ways of raising capital for public company, the public seasoned equity offering is in essence based on the principal-agent contract. Due to the information asymmetry between the management and the investors, this paper is going to analyze whether the management has incentive to voluntarily send signal to investor through disclosing conservatism accounting information to make it distinguished from the low quality companies.

关 键 词：公开增发稳健会计信息信号传递 

分 类 号：F233[经济管理—会计学] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]