投标者为风险规避型引入佣金的分析(一)  

Analysis of Commission on Auctions under Bidders-risk-averse

作　　者：肖海燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北第二师范学院数学与数量经济学院,湖北武汉430205

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2012年第2期250-252,共3页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：湖北省教育厅科学技术研究计划指导性基金资助项目

摘　　要：在投标者为风险规避型的情况下,考虑引入佣金对拍卖结果的影响,发现在对称独立私有价值模型中,对于密封一价拍卖和密封二价拍卖,佣金比例k越大,则投标者的报价越低,卖方的期望收益越少,拍卖行的期望收益越大,但投标者的期望效用与k无关。The effects of commission on auctions were discussed when bidders were risk-averse.It was found that the commission rate has effects on the bidders′ bidding strategy,the expected revenue of the seller and the auctioneer.The bigger the commission rate is,the lower the bidder bids,and the less expected revenue the seller makes,but the more revenue the auctioneer has.And the bidder′s expected utility is not dependent on the commission rate.

关 键 词：拍卖 风险规避 佣金 均衡期望效用 

分 类 号：F724.59[经济管理—产业经济]