基于委托—代理模型的收费公路经营权转让激励方案研究  

Research of Motivation Programs of Toll Roads Management Right Transfer Based on the Principal-agent Model

作　　者：张莹[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]长安大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710064 [2]西安财经学院统计学院,陕西西安710100

出　　处：《统计与信息论坛》2012年第4期82-86,共5页Journal of Statistics and Information

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目<收费公路行业政府规制与市场机制的协调与边界问题研究>(10YJA790209)

摘　　要：高速公路经营权转让的转让方与受让方是委托代理关系。基于委托-代理理论讨论了两种转让契约激励模型的设计,即单一以经济效益产出为依据的激励方案和由经济效益、社会效益相结合为依据的激励方案,对两者进行了比较研究,并通过问卷调查进一步验证了模型分析的结论:外界环境的不稳定性、企业的风险规避度与企业的收益之间成反比;采取包含非经济因素在内的激励方案,对转让、受让双方都有利。The transferer and transferee of highway management right transfer is principal-agent relationship.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper discusses and compares two motivation model designs.One motivation model is only based on the output of economic benefit;and the other is based on the output of economic returns and social benefit.Through the survey,it supports the the conclusion ： the unstability of outer environment and Arrow-Pratt are inversely proportional to the return of the enterprise;applying the motivation program including the nonfinancial factor is beneficial to the transferer and the transferee.

关 键 词：收费公路经营权 委托代理 激励 

分 类 号：F506[经济管理—产业经济]