国家审计结果公告制度研究——基于信号博弈  

China National Audit Reporting System Research——Based on Signaling Game

作　　者：马东山[1] 叶子荣[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学公共管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2012年第5期21-24,共4页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

摘　　要：在我国大力推进民主法制建设的大背景下,公告审计结果已经成为政府的必然选择。审计结果公告制度作为一种信息披露制度,一方面可以解除政府及审计机关的公共受托责任,另一方面为公众监督政府提供了有效途径。但就我国目前的审计结果公告现状来看,不公告审计结果依然是常态,显然,这种状况与我国民主法制建设的发展要求相悖,无法发挥国家审计联系政府和公众的"信息纽带"作用,无法推动社会民主进程的进一步发展。本文通过构建政府与公众的信号博弈模型并求解其均衡路径,以揭示全面实施国家审计结果公告制度的关键条件,据此从建立审计质量评价体系、形成有效的审计人员监督培训机制、提高公众的监督能力和加大处理处罚力度四个方面提出保证我国国家审计结果公告制度有效运行的政策建议。In the context of the promoting the construction of Chinas democracy government by law,announcing the audit results have been an inevitable choice for the government.Audit results reporting system,as an information disclosure system,one can lift public accountability of the government and the audit institutions,and the other can provide an effective means for the public to monitor the government.Viewing from the current situation of the national audit reporting system,reporting the audit results is abnormal,which is contrary to the process of democratic government by law.It can not be played the ＂information link＂ function between the national audit and the public,and not to promote the further development of social democracy.By structuring the signaling game model between the government and the public and solving the equilibrium path,we revealed the key conditions for the full implementation of the national audit reporting system,and also put forward the policy recommendations from the establishment of audit quality evaluation system,forming an effective mechanism for supervising and training of audit staff,improving the public＇s oversight capacity and increasing processing punishment,to ensure effective operation of the national audit reporting system.

关 键 词：国家审计 信号博弈 审计监督 监督机制 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]