多维信息招标下招标代理机构与投标方串谋的博弈模型及分析  

Model and Analysis of Collusion between the Auction Agent and Corruptive Bidder in Multi-dimensional Auction

作　　者：赵冬梅[1] 王园园[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610036

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2012年第8期26-35,共10页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70902037)

摘　　要：在项目业主不具备自行招标能力的工程招标中,招标代理机构利用代理权设租并与投标方串谋的现象屡禁不止.在多维信息招标相关理论基础上构建了招标代理方与行贿投标方串谋的博弈模型,求解了腐败存在下的最优招标机制、均衡腐败金以及均衡腐败概率,分析了腐败概率的影响因素.研究表明调查力度、惩罚力度的加强以及行贿投标方的实际综合质量水平的提高有利于降低腐败发生的概率,而投标方数量的增加可能会促进腐败的发生.In construction projects,where principals don＇t have the ability to organize an auction,collusion between the auction agent and the collusive bidder frequently occur.Based on the theories of multi-dimensional auctions,this paper built the model of auction agent＇s corruptive behaviors.The optimal auction mechanism,equilibrium bride and probability of collusion were figured out.The research shows that,the higher the level of investigating, punishing and real quality realized by the bidder,the smaller the corruption probability. However,the number of bidders may stimulate corruption.

关 键 词：多维信息招标 招标代理机构 串谋 影响因素 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32