大学技术创业过程融资行为分析  

Game Study on the Financing Behaviors in the Process of University Technology Entrepreneurship

作　　者：张琰飞[1] 曹兴[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院 [2]湖南工业大学商学院

出　　处：《科学决策》2012年第4期31-42,共12页Scientific Decision Making

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费项目;教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(项目编号:NCET-07-0857);教育部博士点基金项目(项目编号:20090162110064)

摘　　要：有效的融资机制是大学技术创业成败的关键,利用博弈模型分析了大学教师与投资者在大学技术创业过程中的行为选择。逆向选择模型发现,大学管理缺位下,信息不对称导致难以形成有效的大学技术创业融资机制;信号传递模型发现,大学技术转移中心在大学技术创业融资中具有重要的信号作用。发挥技术转移中心的信号作用,大学要强化其服务职能,改革其管理机制,并争取政府的政策扶持。The effective financing mechanism is the key to the success of university technology en- trepreneurship, and the paper analysed the behavioral choices of university teachers and inves- tors in the the technology entrepreneurial process of university based on Game Model The ad- verse selection model found that it was difficult to form an effective financing mechanism due to asymmetric information under the absence of university administration. The signaling model found that University Technology Transfer Center had an important signal role in the technology venture financing. To achieve the signal role of technology transfer center, the university had to strength- en the technology transfer center functions, and change management mechanisms, and strive for the support and guidance policy of the government.

关 键 词：大学 技术创业 融资博弈 信号传递 

分 类 号：G311[文化科学]