涉农信贷与保险耦合模式下地方政府和保险机构行为的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on the Behaviors of Local Government and Insurance Institutions under the Coupling Mode of Agricultural Credit and Insurance

作　　者：廖建湘[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院

出　　处：《财务与金融》2012年第2期5-9,共5页Accounting and Finance

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目(08AJY040)

摘　　要：运用基于有限理性假设的演化博弈理论,对涉农信贷与保险耦合模式下地方政府和保险机构行为进行分析,得到了地方政府和保险机构同时分别支持和积极参与涉农信贷与保险耦合模式的参数条件,进而得到了涉农信贷与保险耦合模式可持续发展的现实条件,并给出对应的建议。This paper applies evolutionary game theory based on bounded rationality hypothesis, to analyze the local government and insurance institutions＇ behavior under the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mode. We get the parameter conditions under which the local government supports the coupling mode while the insurance institutions participate in it actively. And then, we get the reality conditions for its sustainable development of the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mode, and give the corresponding suggestions.

关 键 词：博弈理论 涉农信贷与保险耦合模式 地方政府 保险机构 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]