损失厌恶供应链应对突变风险的收益共享契约  

On Revenue Sharing Contract in Loss-Aversion Supply Chain under Disruption

作　　者：施国洪[1] 曾月凤[1] 陈敬贤[2] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学工商管理学院,江苏镇江212013 [2]南通大学商学院,江苏南通226019

出　　处：《工业工程》2012年第2期22-26,共5页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(10CGL025);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2010SJB630055);江苏省高校青蓝工程优秀青年骨干教师基金资助项目(苏教师2010第27号)

摘　　要：研究一个风险中性的供应商和具有损失厌恶特性的零售商组成的二阶供应链,在供应链遭遇突变风险的情况下,收益共享契约能否协调该供应链的问题。利用损失厌恶模型对零售商的损失厌恶程度进行了刻画,分别讨论了突变风险发生后分散和集中控制的情况下供应链的整体利润。研究发现,收益共享契约能够协调该供应链,并且零售商的损失厌恶程度越强,契约参数的上下限越大。通过数值算例的方法对上述结论进行了验证,且发现当突变风险导致需求发生变动时,零售商的效用和供应商的利润呈反方向变化。A two-stage supply chain composed of a risk-neutral supplier and a loss-aversion retailer is discussed in this paper. With revenue sharing contract as coordination means, the supply chain coordinate problem under sudden disruptions is studied. By using the loss-averse model to describe the loss-aversion level of the retailer, the profit of the supply chain is analyzed under both decentralized and centralized con- trol modes. Results show that, by using revenue sharing contract, such a supply chain can be coordinated. To do so, the range of the contract parameter value increases as the level of the loss-aversion of the retailer increases. A numerical example is used to verify the results obtained in this paper.

关 键 词：供应链协调 损失厌恶 突变风险 收益共享契约 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]