地方发展型政府的行为逻辑及制度基础  

Behavioral Logic and Institutional Basis of Local Developmental States

作　　者：郁建兴[1] 高翔[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学公共管理学院,教授杭州310027

出　　处：《中国社会科学》2012年第5期95-112,206-207,共18页Social Sciences in China

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大招标项目“加强和改善国家对农业农村发展的调控和引导对策研究”(批准号:08&ZD020);教育部博士点基金项目“县级政府公共服务能力的测度、影响因素与实现机制研究”(编号:200803350112)

摘　　要："中国特色财政联邦主义"和"分权化威权主义"这两种理论并不能有效解释地方政府的行为模式。财政收益最大化对地方政府行为的支配性,并不意味着分权的财政体制是发展型政府形成的充要条件。在分权背景下,横向问责机制对地方政府行为缺乏有效约束力,而以人事权为核心的纵向问责机制具有显著的局限性,由于信息不对称等因素,中央政府较少具备塑造地方政府行为模式的渗透性权力。横向问责机制的不健全和纵向问责机制的局限性,使得财政收益最大化逐渐成为支配地方政府行为的主导逻辑,并最终导致了政府选择性履行职能的局面。The behavioral patterns of local states cannot be adequately explained by theories of'Fiscal Federalism with Chinese Characteristics'and'Regionally Decentralized Authoritarianism.'The dominance of fiscal revenue maximization on the behaviors of local states does not suggest that a regionally-decentralized financial system is a necessary condition for the formation of a local developmental state.In a regionally decentralized context,the horizontal accountability system does not have effective control over the behaviors of local states,whereas the vertical accountability system with the core of personnel power also has obvious limitations. Due to information asymmetry and other reasons,the central state hardly has the pervasive power of shaping the behavioral patterns of local states.Both the defects of the horizontal accountability system and the limitations of the vertical accountability system have propelled the maximization of fiscal revenues to become the dominant logic guiding the behaviors of local states,and have led to their selective fulfillment of their functions.

关 键 词：地方发展型政府 政府职能转变 中央-地方关系 问责有限的分权 

分 类 号：D035.5[政治法律—政治学]