基于激励策略自报电量的电价算法研究  

Power Pricing Algorithm of Consumption Report Model based on Incentive Strategy

作　　者：王丹[1] 李彦平[1] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳大学装备制造综合自动化重点实验室,辽宁沈阳110044

出　　处：《沈阳大学学报（自然科学版）》2012年第1期20-24,共5页Journal of Shenyang University：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61104029)

摘　　要：研究了用户自报用电量的激励电价的建模问题,并设计了相应的电价算法.该模型的主要思想是,让用户自己申报每月的计划用电数额,实际用电超额或是没达到自报额,将给予惩罚性质的电价.运用对策论中的激励Stackelberg策略对模型中的单位电价进行线性激励.此电价模型鼓励用户根据自己的实际需要自报合适的用电量,从长远效益来看,起到了节约资源、满足需求的作用.最后,利用MATLAB对所制订的激励策略进行了数值仿真,仿真结果说明所得方法的有效性和结果的实用性.The modeling of incentive electricity price in the model of the user self-reported consumption was studied and the algorithm of electricity price was designed.The main idea of the model is that users apply the amount of electricity,the part of excess or leavings will be appropriate punished.By using the incentive Stackelberg strategy in the game theory,a linear strategy to unit power price was established.Depending on the model,users are always encouraged to declare the amount of electricity demand according to practical demand.In the long term,resource can be saved and demand can be satisfied.Some numerical simulations were carried out for the linear strategy via MATLAB,thus illustrating the effectiveness and practicability of the proposed algorithm.

关 键 词：电力市场 电价策略 Stackelberg策略 效用函数 

分 类 号：F202[经济管理—国民经济]