需求不确定情况下的供应链价格补贴契约研究  

A Study on Unsalable Subsidy Contract for Supply Chain under Demand Uncertainty

作　　者：龚卓[1] 孙超[1] 张德胜[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛大学复杂性科学研究所,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《绿色科技》2012年第5期222-224,共3页Journal of Green Science and Technology

摘　　要：研究市场需求随机且受零售价格影响环境下单个供应商和单个零售商所组成的两级供应链,针对供应商和零售商的3种不同市场地位的情况,分析了价格补贴契约如何使供应链达到协调。结果表明:在3种情况下价格补贴契约都能使供应链协调。最后通过计算案例,得到了供应商利润和零售商利润随契约参数变化的情况。In this paper,a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer is considered. Market de- manding is uncertain and is influenced by saling price. For three different market roles of the supplier and retailer, it analyses how the Markdown--money Contracts coordinates the supply chain respectively. The re- sult indicates the unsalable subsidy contracts can coordinate the supply chain in the all three circumstances. Finally,a numerical example was given to analyze the profits of the supplier and the retailer with the chan- ging parameters of the contract.

关 键 词：供应链 协调 价格补贴契约 

分 类 号：F570[经济管理—产业经济]