发电机组污染排放约束下电量互换合作博弈优化模型  

A Cooperation Game Optimization Model for Energy Generating Interchange between Power Generation Units with Environmental Emission Constraints

作　　者：谭忠富[1] 董力通[1] 刘文彦[1] 于超[1] 宋艺航[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学经济与管理学院,北京102206

出　　处：《电工技术学报》2012年第5期245-251,共7页Transactions of China Electrotechnical Society

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071053)

摘　　要：在排放条件约束下,发电机组生产的目标是生产成本和污染成本的整体成本最小化。一般而言,大机组的生产成本和污染成本都会低于小机组。机组间进行合作的方式是让部分电量从小机组上转移到大机组上,总体成本降低,然后通过利益分配,使得各个机组的利益大于合作前。本文将污染排放惩罚成本引入到传统的发电经济调度模型中,构建了污染排放成本与发电成本最小化下的合同发电量置换优化模型,并采用合作博弈利益分配的Shapley模型对合作后所有机组之间利润进行优化分配。算例结果表明,该模型能够有效地将发电与污染排放成本高的机组发电量转移到成本低的机组上,实现节能减排的目的。Under the pollution emission conditions, objective of the generators is to minimize the overall cost which include cost of production and cost of pollution. In general, the production costs of the larger units are lower than the smaller units. The cost of pollution is the same. The cooperation way between units is that small units transfer some electric power to large units. After transfering, the overall cost will reduce. Then we carried out the distribution of benefits, the result is that the interests of the various units is greater than the pre-collaboration. Considering emission pollution cost in traditional generation economic scheduling problem, the generation interchange model is constructed, which considers emission pollution and contract generation constraints, then using the cooperative game Shapley model to distribute profits between generation units. The results show that this model can shift generating energy from high-cost of generation and emission units to low-cost units effectively.

关 键 词：发电污染 经济调度 合作博弈 利润分配 

分 类 号：F407.61[经济管理—产业经济] TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]