博弈视角下政府绩效评价模型选择的理论优化  

Theory Optimization of Measurement Model Selection of Government Performance from Game Theory Perspective

作　　者：郎玫[1] 包国宪[2] 

机构地区：[1]云南大学公共管理学院,云南昆明650091 [2]兰州大学管理学院,甘肃兰州730000

出　　处：《西北师大学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期115-120,共6页Journal of Northwest Normal University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"地方政府绩效评价的组织模型及其管理研究"(70673031);云南大学人文社会科学青年研究基金项目"政府内部价值认同对政府绩效评价效果的影响"(11YNUHSS006)

摘　　要：绩效的概念可以说是对以往效率、效益、效能等概念的一种综合与超越。学者和实践者都不断赋予绩效新的内容,并从理论和实现手段上拓展着政府绩效评价的模型、方法和手段。但在政府绩效评价的实践过程中,很难做到将理论的"绩效"全部实现,从博弈的视角来看,主要是由于博弈中的次优解和多重均衡产生的必然性。基于组织权与评价权的不同组合所形成的六种绩效评价理论模型是针对单一功能的评价基础模型,对六种模型适用条件的研究能够进一步提升绩效评价的实现效果。The concept of performance is beyond the former concepts like efficiency,effectiveness,and efficacy.The scholars and the practitioners have devoted to the research of the model and methods of government performance measurement.However,it is difficult to fully achieve the theoretical performance in practice.From the perspective of Game Theory,it is due to the existence of suboptimal results and multiple equilibrium.This paper,based on the analysis of different characteristics and applicable conditions of 6 models,discusses different emphasis of evaluation in different models and their subsequent different performance results in theory,which can improve the effectiveness of government performance measurement.

关 键 词：博弈 政府绩效 绩效评价 模型 优化 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]