地方官员、捕蝇纸效应与公共服务支出的关系——一项有关公共服务型政府建设的研究  

The Relationship of Local Officials,Flypaper Effect and Public Service Expenditure——Research on Construction of Public Service-oriented Government

作　　者：李文军[1] 唐兴霖[1] 赵俊梅[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院,上海200030 [2]成都理工大学文法学院,四川成都610059

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2012年第7期31-35,共5页East China Economic Management

摘　　要：在我国,地方政府是公共服务提供的主导者,而地方官员在公共服务中扮演重要角色。文章构建了1997—2010年我国省级领导与其省份公共服务提供相匹配的数据,从个人微观层面考察这些官员群体(尤其是政府行政首长)对公共服务提供的情况。研究结果表明:省级官员建设公共服务型政府的愿望并不强烈,并且存在"捕蝇纸效应";官员的公共服务支出与他们的晋升相关性低;东部地区公共服务支出比例明显低于广大的中西部地区;官员的流动有利于公共服务的提供。因此,创造公共服务的"竞争性市场",并增强政策的可信承诺;进行税制改革,增加地方财力;增强社会问责,强化地方官员的约束。In China,local government is the leader in providing public services,and the local officials play an important role in the public service.This paper constructs a matchable data system of Chinese provinces leadership and the provincial public services from 1997 to 2010,study the public service provided by official groups（especially the executive heads of government） in the individual micro-level.The results as follows,firstly,the provincial government officials’desire of constructing pub lic service oriented government is not strong,and there exits＂flypaper effect＂.Secondly,officials’public service expendi tures are associated with their promotion lowly.Thirdly,the public services expenditure proportion in eastern regions is signif icantly lower than the central and western regions.Finally,the flow of officials is good for the provision of public services.Therefore,it should create public services of＂competitive market＂,enhance the credibility of policy commitments,take tax reform,increase local financial resources,enhance social accountability,and strengthen the constraints of local officials.

关 键 词：地方官员 转移支付 公共服务 捕蝇纸效应 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]