林农合作组织的合作联盟博弈分析  

Analysis of Alliance Game of Forest Farmer Cooperatives

作　　者：乔羽[1] 宋维明[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京林业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期38-43,共6页Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：林业公益性行业科研专项(200904003-2)

摘　　要：运用博弈论研究林业经济合作组织主体之间的合作问题,通过建立一个合作联盟的博弈模型,分析了林农和合作组织的纳什均衡策略及均衡结果。在此基础上,进一步分析了合作组织达到稳定的规模情况,最后使用案例对博弈模型进行了验证。研究结果表明:如果加入该组织后获得的收益不少于保留收益,林农就会有加入组织的意愿;如果新的林农加入合作组织后能够为原合作组织带来收益增长的空间,合作组织就会制定合理的分配份额激励林农加入。一个地区是否出现林农加入合作组织的行为以及合作组织达到稳定的最大规模与该地区的规模效益函数、组织成本函数、外部性函数和组织的分配规则情况有关。This paper analyzes the Nash equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium outcomes of the forest farm- ers and the cooperatives by creating a model of the alliance game. On this basis, the paper further analyzes the sta- ble size of cooperatives. Finally, a case is used to prove the model. The results of the study show that： If the in- come a forest farmer gets after joining a cooperative is no less than the retained income, he may join the coopera- tive; while if a new member can bring an increase to the income of a cooperative after his participation, the cooper- ative will encourage forest farmers to take part in by laying down reasonable allocation rule. The behavior of the forest farmers＂ joining the cooperative and the largest stable size of the cooperative are both related to the conditions of the scale function, the cost function, the external function and the allocation rule.

关 键 词：林农合作组织 合作联盟博弈 纳什均衡 稳定性规模 

分 类 号：F326.25[经济管理—产业经济]