村民自治的程序民主与实质民主——基于社会选择理论对村支“两委”选举的案例分析  

Procedure Democracy and Practical Democracy of Villagers' Self-governance:A Cases Study of "the Two Committees in a Village" Election Based on Social Choice Theory

作　　者：肖卫[1] 朱有志[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南农业大学经济学院 [2]湖南省社会科学院

出　　处：《南京社会科学》2012年第5期78-85,共8页Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"一般均衡下农业发展;二元经济结构转化与经济增长研究"(11BJL037);教育部人文社科基金青年项目"城乡一体化过程中农村公共物品供给机制与政策研究"(12YJC790208)的成果之一

摘　　要：本文分析了投票悖论与阿罗不可能定理是个人理性决策与集体一致性行动的冲突在社会选择领域的表现,并结合森对悖论的解答,引入信息基础的理性扩张、合约成本和作为契约的程序、制度,以农村村支"两委"选举为例,探讨村民自治过程中不同经济发展水平和结构特征的农村中个人理性走向集体一致性社会选择实现路径,在此基础上提出村民自治中实现程序民主与实质民主统一的对策建议。This paper analyzes the Paradox of Voting and Arrow＇ s Impossibility Theorem that are the conflicts of social choice between individual rational decisions and the collective consistent actions. And then, we introduce rational expansion based on information, contract cost and its procedure or institutional to interpret Sen＇ s solution to Paradox. And it discusses the realizing paths of individual rationality to collective consistency in different economic development levels and structure characteristics of villagers, and explores proposals in favor of realizing unification of procedure democracy and practical democracy in villagers＇ selGgovernance.

关 键 词：村民自治 程序民主 实质民主 投票悖论 阿罗不可能定理 

分 类 号：D035-3[政治法律—政治学]