增长的政治经济逻辑:政府分权与激励的视角  

The Political and Economic Logic in Economic Growth-the Perspective of Government and Incentives

作　　者：张为杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济学院

出　　处：《产经评论》2012年第3期94-101,共8页Industrial Economic Review

基　　金：教育部人文社科重点研究基地项目"组织内部契约关系与激励机制设计"(2010CIB01)的阶段性成果;项目主持人:王询

摘　　要：政府分权是实现我国增长的重要制度安排。本文以中央与地方政府、地方政府与微观主体分权为逻辑起点,以制度-结构-行为-绩效为分析框架,从激励与约束的视角研究地方政府行为。研究认为,在分权激励下,地方会展开"中国式的政府竞争",并过多的保护资本,而忽视劳动力、土地、环境等要素的产权。非均衡的产权制度在经济发展前期能够实现公众与地方政府的共容利益。随外在约束条件的不断变化,在原有的激励模式下,"包容性增长"被"排斥性增长"所替代。在缺乏公众的约束下,地方政府带来激励偏差会加大。因此,作对地方政府的激励是转变经济发展方式的关键。Governmental decentralization is a major institutional arrangement to achieve economic growth. In this paper, the logical starting point is the decentralization from central government to local government, local government to micro - body, and our framework is institution - conduct - structure - performance. The behavior of local government is studied from the perspective of incentives and constraints. Inspired by fiscal incentive, local governments will conduct ＂Chinese - style competition between governments,＂ give the capital too much protection ignoring the property of labor, land, environment and other factors. This non - equilibrium system of property rights can achieve the encompassing interests between local government and public in the early period of economic development. With the changing external constraints, facing the incentive in the original model, ＂inclusive growth＂ is replaced by ＂exclusive growth＂. In the absence of the constraints from the public, the incentive bias brought by local governments will increase. Therefore, getting the governmental incentive right is the key to the transformation of economic development for china.

关 键 词：政府分权 地方政府 激励模式 增长逻辑 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]