侵权干涉与效率违约的比较——以引诱违约情形的经济分析为中心  

Comparisons between Tortious Interference with Contract and Efficient Breach——Economic Analysis of Inducement Breach as the Central

作　　者：刘廷华[1] 

机构地区：[1]宜宾学院政府管理学院,四川宜宾644000

出　　处：《甘肃联合大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第2期109-114,共6页Journal of Gansu Lianhe University:Social Sciences

基　　金：四川省教育厅科研项目"违约责任制度研究--法经济学视角"(10SB058)阶段性成果

摘　　要：效率违约理论认为在引诱违约的情况下,违约能够导致资源流向更高价值的用途,并且减少了交易成本。研究表明,上述两个假设都不能成立。而且由于补偿不充分,效率违约还导致了过多的违约。相反,侵权干涉规则保证了资源流向更高价值的用途,并降低了交易成本,而且避免了过多的违约。The efficient breach theory suggests that efficient breach could lead to resource flow to higher value uses and reduce transaction costs in the case of inducement breach.Studies have shown that these two assumptions are untenable.And because of undercompensation,efficient breach of contract has also led to excessive non-compliance.On the contrary,the rules of tortious interference with contract can ensure resources flow to higher value uses,and reduce transaction costs,and avoid too much non-compliance.

关 键 词：引诱违约 效率违约 侵权干涉 

分 类 号：D923.6[政治法律—民商法学]