物流企业与贷款企业在存货质押融资中的演化博弈分析  

Analysis of Evolutionary Game on Logistics Enterprise and Financing Enterprise in Inventory Financing

作　　者：张璟[1] 朱金福[1] 栗媛[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学民航学院,南京210016 [2]航联保险经纪有限公司,北京100007

出　　处：《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期198-203,共6页Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771046)

摘　　要：为解析物流企业和贷款企业开展存货质押融资时策略选择的互动机制,文章以授信融资模式为例,借助演化博弈理论建立了贷款企业诚信和物流企业监管的演化博弈模型,研究了影响博弈双方策略选择的决定因素及演化稳定策略,通过数值方法验证了稳定性分析结论。结果表明,物流企业和贷款企业组成的动态演化系统存在两个演化稳定策略,概率初值、模型中监管成本及罚金等决策参数的改变均会影响系统的演化结果。To study the interactive mechanism of financing strategy selection of financing enterprise and logistics enterprise in inventory financing,this paper focuses on credit extension financing mode to explore their game models according to the evolutionary game theory.The evolutionary game model concerning financing enterprise＇s honesty and logistics enterprise＇s supervision is established.The evolutionary stable strategies and their determinants are investigated.With the numerical method,the conclusion of system stability is verified.It is concluded that：（1） there are two evolutionary stable strategies in the dynamic evolutionary system which is composed of logistics enterprise and financing enterprise;（2） parameters of checking cost of logistics enterprise,penalty for financing enterprise,cheating revenue of logistics enterprise et al.all affect the system＇s evolutionary direction.

关 键 词：存货质押 贷款企业 物流企业 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]