基于合作博弈论和工程方法的调峰费用分摊  

Peaking cost allocation using cooperative game theory and engineering concept

作　　者：谢俊[1,2] 张晓花[3] 吴复霞[1,2] 付蓉[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学自动化学院,江苏南京210046 [2]浙江大学电气工程学院,浙江杭州310027 [3]常州大学信息科学与工程学院,江苏常州213164

出　　处：《电力系统保护与控制》2012年第11期16-23,共8页Power System Protection and Control

基　　金：南京邮电大学引进人才科研启动基金资助项目(NY210079);江苏省输配电装备技术重点实验室开放课题(2011JSSPD10);国家高技术研究发展计划(863计划)资助项目(2012AA050204)~~

摘　　要：枯水期,水电装机比重较大的水火电系统的调峰任务基本上由水电承担。然而,在市场机制尚没有建立的前提下,水电调峰价值没有细化在政府核定的上网电价中。以我国西北电网枯水期的调峰问题为研究背景,基于合作博弈论提出水电机组调峰费用分摊方法,分析了分摊机制的单调性、超加特性、凸博弈特性,提出若干方法克服Shapley值计算中的组合爆炸问题;基于工程方法提出水电机组调峰费用分摊方法,该机制在统计机组调峰里程的基础上给出对各机组的调峰费用分摊。最后,通过对某4机8节点系统以及西北电网的仿真分析验证了分摊方法的有效性。In low inflow seasons, the peaking task of hydro-thermal power systems is mainly assumed by hydro units. When the electricity market mechanism has not been established, the peaking value of hydro generators will not be reflected in the regulated electricity prices for hydro generators. With the background of the peaking related issues in Northwest China Grid, based on cooperative game theory, a peaking cost allocation method for hydro units is proposed, the monotony, super-additive, and the convex game characteristics of the given mechanism are analyzed, and several methods to conquer the combinational explosion of Shapley value are proposed. Using an engineering concept, another peaking cost allocation method is proposed, considering the peaking mileage of hydro generators. The effectiveness of the proposed allocation methods is showed with the simulation results of a 4-generator 8-bus power system and Northwest China Grid.

关 键 词：水火电系统 水电调峰 费用分摊 合作博弈论 Shapley值分摊法 机组调峰里程 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F123.9[经济管理—世界经济]