农村中小金融机构差别监管的内在机理:由村镇银行生发  

Inner Mechanism on Differential Supervision and Regulation of Small and Medium Rural Financial Institution:Taking Village and Town Bank as an Example

作　　者：张迎春[1] 张璐[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学金融学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《改革》2012年第5期54-59,共6页Reform

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"城乡统筹融资机制研究"(批准号:11BJL029);西南财经大学"211工程"三期项目和西南财经大学2011年重点课题(批准号:2011XG098)

摘　　要：以村镇银行为代表的我国新型农村中小金融机构,其发展至今的运营效果与政策设立的初衷存在着背离。从银行监管理论框架、银行监管成本收益分析以及银行经营利润最大化这三个维度对实施差别监管进行分析后认为,应通过调整村镇银行的资产负债结构以及股权结构,加大对村镇银行的财政政策支持,调整农村地区的监管机构数量,制定差异化的经营策略、进入以及退出准则等有别于传统商业银行的监管规则,以实现村镇银行的可持续发展。The development of village and town bank which is the representative of new kind of small and medium rural financial institution of China,has violated from its original purpose as yet.After analyzing differential supervision from three perspectives,that are theories of banking supervision and regulation,cost and benefit of supervision and regulation,and banks＇ benefit maximum,the authors think that we should to adjust their the asset/liability structures,and ownership structure in village and town bank,add more fiscal support,adjust supervision organizations quantity in rural areas,and make up supervision regulations for their sustainable development,which is different from traditional commercial banks such as,diversified running strategies,entering or quitting rules,as so on.

关 键 词：农村金融 中小银行 村镇银行 差别监管 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]