基于帕累托最优配置的碳排放许可证拍卖机制  

An Auction Mechanism of Carbon Emission Permits Based on Pareto Optimality

作　　者：王明荣[1] 王明喜[2] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学经济学院,北京100070 [2]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京100029

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2012年第5期96-108,共13页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"基于碳交易的拍卖理论与应用研究"(批准号71001097);北京市社科联青年社科人才资助项目"低碳约束下北京市外贸商品结构优化研究"(批准号2010SKL012);博士后科学基金第四批特别资助项目"碳排放许可证拍卖机制与应用研究"(批准号201104167)

摘　　要：兑现2020年碳减排目标的承诺为我国碳交易市场的建立提供了新的契机,同时使得"如何以最小化经济增长冲击降低二氧化碳排放量"成为一个焦点问题。本文针对"如何有效配置碳排放许可证"做一个前瞻性研究,把帕累托最优概念引入碳排放许可证拍卖—交易框架,设计一个新的碳排放许可证拍卖机制,其规则相对简单,仅有四步构成,易于被市场参与者理解和接受,而且在有限时间内此机制收敛于一个帕累托最优配置,从而实现了碳排放许可证资源的有效利用,在没有平局出现的约束下,最终的均衡配置是唯一的。此外,文中的拍卖机制不仅能最大化卖方的收益,而且买方还拥有占优竞标策略,这些优点决定了此机制在将来的商业应用中能被买卖双方所青睐。最后,用一个具体案例解释新机制的操作过程及其在实践中的可行性,为环境交易所提供一个备选的交易方案。Chinese government claimed that it would commit to the carbon reduction target in 2020,which provides a new opportunity for the establishment of China＇s carbon trading market.Typically,it becomes a focus on how to minimize the impact of carbon emission reduction on economic growth.This paper studies a prospective problem as to how to allocate efficiently carbon emission permits.We first introduce the concept of Pareto optimality into the auction-trade system,and develop a new auction mechanism for carbon emission permits.This mechanism consists of four steps,so it is relatively simple and easy to be understood and accepted by players.In finite rounds,the mechanism is proven to converge to a Pareto optimal allocation,and therefore the carbon emission permits resource is used efficiently;With no ties,the Pareto optimal allocation is unique.Besides,in our mechanism,the seller can obtain the maximum revenue and buyers have a dominant bidding strategy.These advantages show that the mechanism is favored by the seller and buyers in future commercial applications.Finally,we use a case to explain the operation of the mechanism and its feasibility in practice,providing an alternative way for the environment exchange.

关 键 词：帕累托最优 碳减排 机制设计 

分 类 号：F062.1[经济管理—政治经济学]