网络外部性、接入定价与电信竞争  

Network Externalities,Access Pricing and Telecommunication Competition

作　　者：李美娟[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学应用经济学博士后流动站,上海200433 [2]云南师范大学经济与管理学院,云南昆明650092

出　　处：《预测》2012年第3期76-80,共5页Forecasting

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(11CJY043);云南省哲学社会科学规划基金资助项目(HZ201124);云南省教育厅科学基金资助项目(09Y0109)

摘　　要：本文通过构建一个n期动态博弈模型分析了接入定价与电信竞争问题。当存在n期竞争时,如果接入价格大于接入成本,将会导致电信运营商网络规模的大小与其在零售市场产品价格的高低成反比。同时,若某一运营商在竞争初期拥有比竞争对手更多的用户基数,且在第一期新用户加入该运营商网络的比例大于其初始市场份额,则在网络外部性的作用下,通过n期竞争后将产生马太效应。研究结果得出:当存在n期电信竞争时,规制者应以低于接入成本的方法进行接入定价,这样不仅有利于电信竞争效率的提高,而且还可以改善消费者福利;若电信运营商的通话流量平衡,为在实践中更便于操作,可采取免接入费制度进行接入定价。Abstract：By building a n-period dynamic game model, this paper analyzes the access pricing and telecommunication competition, if the access price is higher than the access cost in n-period competition, which will lead to the result that the size of the network is inversely proportional to retail prices. Simultaneously, because of network externalities, if an operator has a larger installed base than the competitor in the initial stage, and in the first phase proportion of new users joining this operator is larger than its initial market share, by multi-period network competition, it will lead to Matthew effect. Therefore, access prices should be lower than the access cost, which will not only help to improve the efficiency of telecommunications competition, but also can improve consumer welfare. When the call flows of operators are balance, the regulator may take the bill and keep to easily operate in practice.

关 键 词：网络外部性 接入定价 电信竞争 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]