地方物流供应商“藏捏”信息行为的监管机制  

Regulating Mechanism of the Civilian Logistics Suppliers’ Hiding Information Behavior

作　　者：姚平[1] 姜大立[1] 刘军[1] 姜玉宏[1] 

机构地区：[1]后勤工程学院后勤信息工程系

出　　处：《后勤工程学院学报》2012年第3期71-74,共4页Journal of Logistical Engineering University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871119/G0109);国家社会科学基金资助项目(09CJY012)

摘　　要：针对军民融合现代军事物流体系内物流实体存有＂藏捏＂信息行为,难以实现信息真正共享,妨害军队物资采购的问题,从地方物流供应商＂藏捏＂信息动机分析入手,考虑到安全保密原则,基于交纳保密保证金的做法对格罗夫斯机制进行修改,建立地方物流供应商＂藏捏＂信息行为的监管机制,并运用算例证明了该机制的科学有效性。Information is a military core resource. However, there is hiding information behavior in the integrated civilian-mili tary modem military logistics system because of self-serving behavior, therefore, it is difficult to achieve true information sharing. Considering the principle of security and confidentiality, the hiding information .motivation of the civilian logistics suppliers is ana- lyzed to establish the regulating mechanism of the civilian logistics suppliers＇ hiding information behavior based on providing bail to modify the Groves mechanism, and the corrected mechanism is proved by an example. This regulating mechanism is very impor- tant for civilian logistics suppliers to share information in the integrated civilian-military modem military logistics system.

关 键 词：“藏捏”信息 偏差度 物流供应商 监管机制 

分 类 号：E233[军事—军事理论]