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机构地区:[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,844000 [2]住房和城乡建设部
出 处:《审计研究》2012年第3期32-36,共5页Auditing Research
摘 要:政府投资审计声誉机制是当前政府投资审计任务量大、审计力量不足状况下充分发挥政府投资审计"免疫系统"功能的重要手段。声誉机制能够有效地约束和防范被审计单位的机会主义行为,提高政府投资审计的监督效率。本文利用KMRW声誉模型研究审计机关与被审计单位的多阶段动态博弈关系,提出维护审计机关声誉的重要条件是保持适当的审计奖罚。针对不同审计奖罚力度对审计机关声誉的不同影响,本文还提出建立和强化政府投资审计声誉机制的若干政策建议。In the condition of heavy workload and lack of resources, reputation mechanism in governmental investment audit is an important means to give full role to the audit function of the immune system in govemmental investment. Reputation mechanism can constraint and prevent the opportunistic behavior of the audited entity, and can improve the efficiency of audit supervision. In this paper, KMRW reputation model is applied in relationship research of multi-stage dynamic game between audit institutions and the audited entity, and the result is that in a repeated game case appropriate audit punishment is an important condition to maintain audit institutions reputation. Different reward and punishment intensity of audit will cause different reputation of audit organization. This paper also proposed policy recommendations for establishment and strengthening of reputation mechanism in governmental investment audit.
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