监管风险、事务所规模与审计质量  

Supervision Risk,Auditor Size and Audit Quality

作　　者：宋衍蘅[1] 肖星[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,310058 [2]清华大学管理学院

出　　处：《审计研究》2012年第3期83-89,共7页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于会计师事务所整体和个体差异的审计师声誉与审计质量关系研究"(项目批准号:71072116)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：我国会计师事务所规模与审计质量之间是否存在正相关关系,现有研究一直存在争议。本文从注册会计师的执业环境出发,对此进行了重新审视。用上市公司实际控制人的控制权与现金流权之差衡量事务所面临的监管风险,研究发现,大事务所只对监管风险较高的客户提供高质量的审计服务。进一步的研究表明,事务所面临的监管环境改善后,大事务所才对所有客户提供高质量的审计服务,审计质量与事务所规模之间的正相关关系不再依赖监管风险而存在。因此,在法律环境相对薄弱的情况下,加强监管是促使会计师事务所提供高质量审计服务的有效机制。Different from the results of studies based on advanced markets, the positive relationship between auditor size and audit quality are not found in most of researches based on China. This paper reviews the relationship between auditor size and audit quality after taking into consideration the supervision risk of audits. We measure supervision risk with the control right and its divergence between cash flow right of ultimate controller of listed firms. We found that bigger auditors provide higher quality audits only to clients with higher supervision risks. Further results show that bigger auditor provide higher quality audits to all clients after supervision risk increases. Our results imply that strengthening supervision from regulators is an efficient alternative institution mechanism for the improvement of audit quality when legal environment is poor.

关 键 词：事务所规模 监管风险 审计风险 审计质量 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]