非对称信息条件下销售商的采购策略  

A vendor's procurement strategy under conditions of asymmetric information

作　　者：李敏[1] 袁文燕[1] 杨丰梅[1] 李健[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京化工大学理学院,北京100029 [2]北京化工大学经济管理学院,北京100029

出　　处：《北京化工大学学报（自然科学版）》2012年第3期105-108,共4页Journal of Beijing University of Chemical Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70801003/71171011);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(zz1133)

摘　　要：研究了关于制造商的单位生产成本信息不对称时,销售商和制造商之间的采购策略问题。在对称信息条件下,通过极大值原理得到最优订货量与转移支付;非对称信息下,由于制造商单位生产成本信息隐匿,运用揭示原理,建立了销售商采购策略的最优控制模型并得到了解析解。最后对所建模型进行了数值计算和分析,数值结果显示非对称信息情况下,最优订货量变少且制造商利润增加,销售商利润减少。This paper studies the procurement strategy between a vendor and a manufacturer when the unit cost of production of the manufacturer is unknown to the vendor.Under symmetric information conditions,the optimal solution of the objective function can be obtained by the maximum principle.Under asymmetric information conditions where the unit cost of production is hidden,we have established the vendor’s optimal control model and obtained the analytic solution through the revelation principle.Finally,through a simulation experiment,it has been found that compared with the symmetric information conditions,the optimal order quantity decreases,the manufacturer’s profit increases,and the vendor’s profit decreases under conditions of asymmetric information.

关 键 词：供应链 非对称信息 委托代理理论 最优控制理论 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]