逆向供应链中回收定价博弈模型及复杂性分析  

Analysis on Game Model and Complexity of Recycling Pricing in Reverse Supply Chain

作　　者：郭悦红[1,2] 马军海[2] 张晓杰[3] 

机构地区：[1]天津职业技术师范大学经管学院,天津市300222 [2]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津市300072 [3]天津中集物流装备有限公司,天津市300072

出　　处：《中国农机化》2012年第3期56-59,65,共5页Chinese Agricul Tural Mechanization

基　　金：天津市哲学社会科学项目(P20100076);天津市科技发展战略研究计划项目(10ZLZLZF03800)

摘　　要：利用重复博弈理论和复杂系统理论研究了逆向供应链系统动力学特性,建立了以回收价格为决策变量、边际利润为决策依据的重复博弈模型。通过数值模拟,得出三个结论:①回收价格到临界值,系统进入混沌状态;②再造品的销售价格超过临界值时,系统进入混沌状态;③系统对回收价格的初始值具有敏感性,初始值的微小变化会可能会引起回收市场价格很大波动。该结论为逆向供应链中企业指导确定每阶段的最佳回收价格提供决策依据,以实现收益最大化。With the repeated game theory and complexity system theory, the paper studies system dynamics characteristics of reverse supply chain, and establishes mathematical model in which recycling price is decision variable, marginal profit is decision basis. Through the numeri- cal simulation, the results showed as follow. Firstly, when the recycling price exceeds a critical value, system will entry chaotic state. Secondly, when remanufactured products price exceeds a critical value, system will entry chaotic state. Thirdly, the recycling market is sensitive to the initial value of recycling price. The minor changes of initial value can cause a big fluctuation of the recycling price. These conclusions provide decision basis of determining the optimal pricing in every stage for enterprises in reverse supply chain to realize revenue maximization.

关 键 词：重复博弈 逆向供应链 复杂性 混沌 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]