基于非对称演化博弈的农业产业投资基金寻租问题  

Rent-seeking Problems of Agricultural Industrial Investment Fund Based on the Asymmetric Evolution Game

作　　者：岳意定[1] 廖建湘[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《系统工程》2012年第4期45-49,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(08AJY040);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70873136)

摘　　要：由于农业产业投资基金市场制度的不完善、信息不对称和代理问题的存在,基金管理人的"内部人控制"成为可能,这使得农业产业投资基金在发展运作中存在寻租问题。本文通过非对称演化博弈分析了农业产业投资基金中的基金管理人和农业企业家的寻租问题。通过寻租博弈的四种情况分析了基金管理人和农业企业家寻租策略的演化路径和稳定状态,指出提高政府监管、完善市场制度是解决农业产业投资基金市场寻租问题的最好途径。Because of the imperfect investment fund market system of agricultural industry,asymmetric information and agency problems,the fund manager’s ＂internal control＂ is possible,which leads to rent-seeking problem ot the managers of the agricultural industrial investment funds.In this paper,we use asymmetric evolutionary game analysis of rent-seeking problem of the fund managers and agricultural entrepreneurs in the agricultural industrial investment funds.Through analyzing four Rent-seeking game situations,we analyze the evolution path of agricultural entrepreneurs’ and fund managers’ rent-seeking strategies.Finally,we point out that increasing government regulation and improving the market system is the best way to solve the problem of rent-seeking in the agricultural industrial investment funds’ markets.

关 键 词：农业产业投资基金 寻租 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]