基于微观博弈的企业节能减排信贷分析  

Credit Analysis on Energy Saving and Emission Reduction from Game Theory

作　　者：赵湘莲[1] 陆敏[1,2] 李岩岩[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学,南京210016 [2]南京审计学院,南京210029

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2012年第5期137-143,共7页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划基金项目(项目编号:10YJA630217);江苏省高校自然科学基金项目(项目编号:11KJD110002);江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目(项目编号:CXLX11-0219)

摘　　要：节能减排的动力主要来自微观主体的企业,但节能减排自身投入产出的不对称性又让企业缺乏行动积极性,同时节能减排作为企业的非主营业务也会导致企业的资金障碍。本文从企业面对高排放和低排放项目的行为选择出发,建立信贷部门与企业的效用函数,基于非合作、合作博弈视角分析不同参数的变化对各自效用的影响,并进行比较分析。研究结果表明:(1)在非合作博弈情形下,罚款的边际效率会越来越低;而当企业与信贷部门经理合谋时,罚款不会改变企业高排放概率和金融机构的审查概率;(2)信贷部门经理的管理惰性一方面会诱发较高的企业高排放概率,另一方面也会增加金融机构的信贷风险,放大金融体系的脆弱性;(3)加大失信企业的粉饰成本和扩大低排放企业的声誉效用的有效结合可以实现整体利益的提高。Although having the main impetus for energy saving and emission reduction, enterprises lack the motivation to take steps due to the input-output asynenetry in energy saving and emission reduction, while energy saving and emission reduction as the enterprises＇ non-core business could also lead to financial obstacles. This paper analyzes enterprises＇ behavior choices between high emission and low emission, comstructing credit deparunents＇ and enterprises＇ utility functions, discussing how their behavior variation influence the utilities from non- cooperative and cooperative perspective, then carries out comparison analysis. It shows that： （1） Marginal efficiency of fine turns lower and lower in non- cooperative case, while fine won＇t change the probability of high emission and inspection in cooperative one; （2） Managers＇ inertia on the one hand induces greater probability of high emission, on the other hand increases the credit risk, thereby enlarges the vulnerability of financial system; （3） the effective combination of stnmgthening enterprises＇ whitewash cost and expanding low emission enterprises＇ reputation could improve the overall interests.

关 键 词：节能减排 信贷分析 博弈 声誉效用 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]