城镇居民医疗保险医疗供方道德风险博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Moral Hazard Prevention of Medical Service Providers in Medical Insurance for Urban Residents

作　　者：胡西厚[1] 于微微[1] 李华业[1] 

机构地区：[1]滨州医学院卫生管理学院,山东烟台264003

出　　处：《西安电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期17-20,共4页Journal of Xidian University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金项目(编号:ZR2010GM009)阶段性成果

摘　　要：在分析城镇居民医疗保险医疗供方道德风险影响因素的基础上,通过医疗供方与参保城镇居民患者及城镇居民医疗保险经办机构之间的博弈分析,提出从加强医疗供方职业素质教育、弱化医疗供方道德风险利益驱动、建立有效的道德风险监督与激励机制、建立信息公开透明机制等方面规避城镇居民医疗保险中医疗供方的道德风险。Based on the analyses of the main factors influencing the moral hazard of the medical service providers in urban residents＇ medical insurance and the game between medical service providers, insured residents, and the insurance agents, the paper presents the following ways of preventing such hazard： strengthening the vocational quality education of the medical service providers, resisting the temptation arising from moral hazard of medical service providers, and establishing effective supervision and motivation mechanism as well as information publicity mechanism.

关 键 词：城镇居民医疗保险 医疗供方 道德风险 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F840.613[经济管理—保险]