中国房地产市场政府调控政策的动态博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Government Regulation Policy in Chinese Real Estate Market

作　　者：丁聪[1] 刘应宗[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《西安电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期55-60,共6页Journal of Xidian University：Social Science Edition

摘　　要：本文根据中央政府、地方政府、房地产商和金融机构四个利益集团在房地产市场中的多阶段动态博弈过程的讨论,分析了我国房地产市场政府调控政策的目标与方向。我们发现:地方政府、房地产商和金融机构由于其各自的利益需求形成了自然联盟。中央政府若要改变现有的博弈格局就必须增加对地方政府保障房投资的支持力度。通过对中央-地方联盟与中央-金融机构联盟博弈均衡解的比较分析,我们得出中央政府必须与地方密切合作,以激励地方增加保障房投资为调控方向,力求改变住宅商品房单一供应的局面,从而实现房地产市场可持续发展的调控目标。On analyzing the game process of the central government, the local government, land agents and banking institutions in Chinese real estate market, we discuss the target and direction of government regulation policy regarding to the real estate market in China. We find that： The local government, land agents and banking institutions form the natural alliance due to their respective interest demand. The central government should increase financial support for the local government to build indemnificatory housing. Through the comparison and analysis of the Nash equilibrium of the central-local alliance game and the central-financial institutions alliance game, the paper concludes that the central government must work more closely with the local in order to stimulate local increase in the construction of indemnificatory housing, and strive to change the single supply situation of residential commodity house, so as to realize the sustainable development of real estate market control target.

关 键 词：房地产市场 政府调控 动态博弈 多阶段博弈 

分 类 号：F293.35[经济管理—国民经济]