单一制国家财政联邦制的“中央-地方”财政关系  

Central-local Fiscal Relations under Fiscal Federalism in a Unitary State

作　　者：朱军[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学财政与税务学院,江苏南京210046 [2]财政部财政科学研究所博士后流动站,北京100142

出　　处：《财经研究》2012年第6期134-144,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC790416);南京财经大学科研基金项目(A2011017)的资助

摘　　要：财政联邦主义是联邦主义政治理念在财政领域的应用。在单一制政治体制下实行财政联邦主义,中央和地方之间的财政关系有其特殊之处。文章通过构建两种异质群的演化博弈模型,采用系统动力学方法研究了中国"中央—地方"财政关系的演化特征。研究发现,当前的固定分权格局使中国的中央财政与地方财政之间处于一种失衡状态,存在"一放即乱,一收即死"的"治乱循环"。Fiscal federalism is an application of political federalism phi- losophy to public finance. Under fiscal federalism in a unitary state, the fis- cal relations between central and local governments have their own charac- teristics. By establishing an evolutionary game theory model of two hetero- geneous populations, this paper discusses the evolutionary path of central- local fiscal relations based on system dynamics. It concludes that the central -local fiscal relations remain in a disequilibrium state due to current fixed tax sharing system, and there is a cycle of chaotic state under fiscal decentraliza- tion and inactive state under fiscal centralization.

关 键 词：单一制 财政联邦主义 演化博弈 财政关系 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]