审计机关机构设置与审计质量:基于分权制衡理论视角的分析  

Audit Institution Setup and Audit Quality:An Analysis from the Perspective of Decentralized and Balanced Power Theory

作　　者：和秀星[1] 曹严礼[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京审计学院国际审计学院,南京211815 [2]南京审计学院金融学院,南京211815

出　　处：《当代财经》2012年第6期112-120,共9页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目(PAPD);教育部哲学社会科学规划项目(12YJAZH106)

摘　　要：政府审计机关履行审计职能的权力可分解为审计立项权、审计取证权、审计报告权及处理处罚权等。然而受制于审计机关内部机构设置的现状,当前多种审计权力的行使主要集中于业务部门。由于分权制衡的有效性不足,机会主义行为很有可能发生,审计机关内部机构设置方式已成为当前影响政府审计质量的关键性因素。因此,通过机构改革与创新,形成审计权力的相对分离与制约机制,增加审计透明度和审计权力监督效果,减少审计合谋与过滤行为,对保障审计质量具有十分重要的现实意义。The power performed by government auditing institutions can be classified into such powers as power of project application, evidence acquisition, results reporting and settlement and pun- ishment. However, restricted by the present conditions of the internal institution setup of the auditing bodies, the performance of the current multiple auditing powers mainly focuses on the operational de- partments. Owing to the inefficiency of the decentralized and balanced power system, opportunist be- havior is likely to take place. Therefore, the way to set up the internal institutions in the auditing bodies has become one of the key factors affecting the quality of government audit. Hence, it has great practical significance to guarantee the audit quality by establishing a relatively separated and restricted mechanism of auditing power, increasing the audit transparency and supervision over auditing power, and reducing audit conspiracy and screening behavior through institutional reform and innovation.

关 键 词：职能机构 分权制衡 机会主义 审计质量 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学]