经济责任审计的审计发现与问责悖论  

Audit Finding and Accountability Paradox in Economic Responsibility Audit

作　　者：黄溶冰[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京审计学院江苏省公共工程审计重点实验室,江苏南京210029

出　　处：《中国软科学》2012年第5期182-192,共11页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金<我国节能减排的环境审计规制研究>(11BGL062);江苏省高校自然科学研究重大项目<基于效力.效果模型的国家审计质量研究>(11KJA630001);江苏高校哲学社会科学重点研究项目<信息化规制工具在节能减排中的应用研究>(2010ZDIXM035);优势学科建设工程资助项目(审计科学与技术)的阶段性成果(PAPD)

摘　　要：利用2003-2010年全国审计机关经济责任审计的有关数据,通过实证研究的方法比较了经济责任审计的审计发现在审计主体之间以及审计对象之间的分布特征。研究结果表明:不同审计机关之间在查出主要问题的查证环节不存在显著差异;但在问责环节存在显著差异,高层级的审计机关问责力度较大,且较少采取内部问责方式。国有企业和政府部门在查出主要问题的查证环节存在显著差异,国有企业的损失浪费现象比较严重;但两者在问责环节不存在显著差异。针对经济责任审计中存在的查证与问责环节相互脱节的现象,本文给出了一个基于规制俘获理论的解释,提出在经济责任中防范规制俘获的政策建议。By means of empirical research methods and relevant datum from 2003 to 2010,the audit founding characteristics of economic responsibility audit are compared among auditors as well as auditees.The result of analysis demonstrates that there are no significant differences on checking aspect of problem founding among auditors,but there exist remarkable differences on responsibility asking aspect,the higher scale auditor strengths higher accountability and less takes inner sanction style.There are significant differences on checking aspect of problem founding between state-owned enterprise and government,the loss and waste in state-owned enterprise are more common,but they are no significant differences between responsibility asking aspect.On basis of explanation of capture regulation theory for the phenomenon of audit accountability paradox,several policy suggestions of preventing regulation capture are pointed out on party and government leaders’ auditing and supervision.

关 键 词：公共受托责任 经济责任审计 审计发现 问责悖论 规制俘获 

分 类 号：F239.47[经济管理—会计学]