风险感知下开发商绿色开发决策演化博弈  

Evolution game of developers'decision-making on green building under risk perception

作　　者：马辉[1] 王建廷[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津城市建设学院经济与管理学院,天津300384

出　　处：《计算机工程与应用》2012年第17期224-228,共5页Computer Engineering and Applications

基　　金：住房和城乡建设部软课题(No.2011-R1-27);天津市高等学校人文社会科学研究项目(No.20102123)

摘　　要：根据绿色住宅分级制度,设定开发商之间的博弈支付矩阵,用演化博弈的分析方法对风险感知下的有限理性开发商群体的策略演化过程进行分析,研究有限理性个体的学习机制,分析个体间学习行为的影响因素,建立种群间动态复制方程;利用动力学仿真的方法对多种群群体演化博弈过程进行模拟与分析。实验结果表明,激励强度越大,群体演化的速度越快,同时绿色住宅激励机制设计应当与绿色住宅分级制度相结合,实施有差别的激励政策,才能更好地实现激励目标。According to the rating system of green building, a payoff matrix is provided which is employed in the developers＇ game of development decision. The making decision behavior under risk and the decision evolution process developers are analyzed. The learning mechanism between limited-rational developers is studied. The factors of learning behavior are obtained and the replicated dynamic equations are advanced subsequently. Dynamics simulation technologies are employed to simulate evolution processes between the multiple populations. Experimental results show that higher incentive intensity indicates the higher speed of population evolution. Moreover green building rating system should be introduced and applied to the incentive mechanism designing. As a result, discriminating incentive policy makes it possible to meet the incentive objectives better.

关 键 词：群体演化博弈 有限理性 绿色住宅 激励机制设计 动力学仿真 

分 类 号：C94[自然科学总论—系统科学]