债权人监督与ST公司经理人代理成本  

Creditor Monitoring and Manager Agency Cost in ST Companies

作　　者：苏玲[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081 [2]新疆财经大学会计学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830012

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期74-79,共6页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：北京市属高等学校人才强教深化计划项目"高层次人才资助计划"(PHR20100512)

摘　　要：以2008～2010年新增ST公司为研究样本,考察银行监督、政府控制、法律制度环境以及内部治理交互作用对ST公司被实施特别处理前三年经理人代理成本的综合治理效应。研究发现,银行监督有显著的治理效应,其与股权集中度、内部激励机制有一定的交互治理效应,与政府控制之间没有交互治理效应。在法律制度环境模型研究中,发现银行监督无治理效应,法律制度环境与银行监督之间没有交互治理效应。研究结果表明,提升债权人监督有效性的途径应是加大商业银行改革力度,减少政府干预,加强法律公平性和规范公司内部治理。With the newly-added ST companies in 2008～2010 as research samples,this article examines the comprehensive governance efficiency of interactive effect respectively from bank monitoring,government control,legal system environment and internal management upon the manager agency cost in ST companies during their previous three years before special treatment.The research finds that bank monitoring has significant governance effect and it does not have the interactive effect of governance with state control,while it has more interactive governance effect with ownership concentration and internal incentive mechanism.In the legal system environment model,bank monitoring has no treatment effect and there is no interaction governance effect between legal environment and bank monitoring.The research result shows that the way to enhance the effect of creditor monitoring is to intensify the reform in commercial banks,reduce the government intervention,strengthen the legal equity and regulate the internal management.

关 键 词：债权人监督 经理人代理成本 ST公司 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]