宏观审慎监管对传染性银行风险的控制作用研究  

A Study on the Effect of Macro-Prudential Regulations to Control Contagious Banking Risks

作　　者：李静婷[1] 孟繁旺[2] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学金融学院,北京100029 [2]北京大学马克思主义学院,北京100871

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期87-94,共8页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

摘　　要：针对金融危机暴露出的传染性银行风险对金融稳定危害增大的现象,通过分析宏观审慎工具对于不同风险传染渠道的控制作用,以Rochet模型为基础建立宏观审慎模型,从理论和模型的角度论证了宏观审慎监管对传染性银行风险的控制作用并分析了作用机制,同时选取中国商业银行合并数据,对不同政策工具组合的作用效果进行了实证研究,证明现阶段监管工具中存款准备金率的控制效果最显著,应完善宏观审慎监管框架,构建宏观审慎监管工具组合对传染性银行风险进行控制。With the threat of contagious banking risk against financial stability which is becoming more and more serious,this essay firstly analyzes the control effect of macro-prudential regulatory tools over different channels of contagious banking risks,and then establishes a macro-prudential model based on Rochet Model,to demonstrate the control effect of macro-prudential regulation on contagious banking risks from both theory and model perspectives.Besides,this essay makes an empirical study on the effect of different combination of tools using consolidated data of Chinese commercial banks.The result shows that reserve requirement ratio（RRR） has the most remarkable effect while China should improve its macro-prudential regulatory framework,and use macro-prudential tools to control the contagious banking risks.

关 键 词：宏观审慎监管 传染性银行风险 银行间市场 政策工具 

分 类 号：F830.2[经济管理—金融学]