公平、公开、激励与利他行为——基于独裁者实验的分析  

How Does Equity,Public,Incentive Affect Altruistic Behavior

作　　者：张亚维[1] 魏清[1] 张莉[1] 

机构地区：[1]扬州大学商学院,江苏扬州225009

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2012年第3期89-94,共6页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：教育部项目"慈善事业发展机制研究--中国问题与政策建议"(项目编号:08JA790115)前期研究成果

摘　　要：标准的独裁者实验中的支出额可以测量利他行为,本文通过设计独裁者实验的不同条件,考察利他行为的可持续性以及初始所得的公平性、信息的公开性和支出配套的激励因素对利他行为的影响。实验结果显示,个体初始所得的公平性对利他捐赠的影响不确定,公开信息和给予支出配套的激励会提高捐赠水平,并对初始所得处于均值以上的优势不平等者有良好的正向捐赠激励,但对初始所得处于均值以下的劣势不平等者有反向作用。The proposers giving in dictator games can measure the level of altruism. By designing different games, this paper estimate the sustainability of altruistic behavior and analyze the effects of some conditions on the giving, such as the endowment equity, public information and incentives. We found uncertain effect of endowment heterogeneity, but public information and incentives are accounted for the improvement of giving, people whose originally income is above average will increase their giving, but will decrease the giving of those whose income is below average.

关 键 词：独裁者实验 利他 公开信息 激励 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]