投标人参考点效应与最优公开保留价博弈分析  

Game Analysis of the Reference Point of Bidders and the Public Reserve Price

作　　者：王文举[1] 杨颖梅[2] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学经济学院 [2]北京信息科技大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《数量经济技术经济研究》2012年第6期127-139,共13页Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(10AJY002);北京市高等学校人才强教深化计划高层次人才资助项目(PHR20100513);北京市优秀博士学位论文指导教师人文社科项目(YB20091003801)的资助

摘　　要：本文从行为经济学出发,用博弈论的方法研究存在参考点效应时,投标人在第一价格和第二价格密封招标中的报价策略以及招标人的最优公开保留价定价策略,并对不同招标方式下投标人的期望收益进行比较。本文给出存在参考点效应时招标最优公开保留价的定价公式,分析了参考点效应和投标人数对最优公开保留价的影响。研究表明,在采用公开保留价的情况下,考虑投标人参考点效应对报价策略的影响时,不同招标方式给投标人带来的期望收益是相等的,即此时招标支付等价性命题仍然成立。此外,随着投标人参考点效应的增强和投标人数的增加,招标人的最优公开保留价下降。From the perspective of behavioral economics, this paper studies the relationship between the reference point and the public reserve price. Firstly, this paper analyzes the bidders＇ strategy of the first and second sealed bidding, obtains the optimal public reserve price and compares the expected revenue. Then, this pa- per studies the influencing of the reference point and the number of bidders to the optimal public reserve price. The study concludes： in the case of a public reserve price, considering the effectiveness of the reference point, the expected return that can be brought by different bidding ways is the same; the equivalence of payment is still established; with the reference point effects to enhance and increasing the number of bidders, the optimal public reserve price is decreasing.

关 键 词：博弈论 密封招标 参考点效应 最优公开保留价 

分 类 号：F224.0[经济管理—国民经济]