Polar differential power attacks and evaluation  

作　　者：TANG Ming QIU ZhenLong GAO Si YI Mu LIU ShuBo ZHANG HuanGuo JIN YingZhen 

机构地区：[1]School of Computer Science,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China [2]State Key Laboratory of Information Security,Institute of Software,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China [3]Centre for Computer and Information Security Research School of Computer Science and Software Engineering University of Wollongong,Wollongong,NSW 2522,Australia

出　　处：《Science China(Information Sciences)》2012年第7期1588-1604,共17页中国科学（信息科学）（英文版）

基　　金：sponsored by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 60970116, 60970115,90718006, 61003267)

摘　　要：Side channel attacks （SCAs） on security software and hardware have become major concerns on computer and system security. The existing SCAs generally require the knowledge of the corresponding crypto- graphic algorithm and implementation adopted in the target; therefore, they are not fully suitable for practical applications. In this paper, we propose a novel SCA--polar differential power attack （polar DPA）. We found that DPA peaks have different biases for different eryptographic algorithms and implementations. Based on these biases, we can successfully attack a block cipher, assuming that the cipher algorithm uses a secret key in its first round, without the knowledge of the cipher algorithm or implementation. Other rounds can be treated as a black box. We present a detailed theoretical analysis and experiment to demonstrate the correctness and efficiency of our scheme. Furthermore, our scheme has demonstrated an improvement over the leakage evaluation scheme due to Ichikawa et al. （CHES 2005）. Our evaluation method can be used in electronic design automatic （EDA） flows and can help security circuit designers to understand the data leakage due to SCAs.Side channel attacks （SCAs） on security software and hardware have become major concerns on computer and system security. The existing SCAs generally require the knowledge of the corresponding crypto- graphic algorithm and implementation adopted in the target; therefore, they are not fully suitable for practical applications. In this paper, we propose a novel SCA--polar differential power attack （polar DPA）. We found that DPA peaks have different biases for different eryptographic algorithms and implementations. Based on these biases, we can successfully attack a block cipher, assuming that the cipher algorithm uses a secret key in its first round, without the knowledge of the cipher algorithm or implementation. Other rounds can be treated as a black box. We present a detailed theoretical analysis and experiment to demonstrate the correctness and efficiency of our scheme. Furthermore, our scheme has demonstrated an improvement over the leakage evaluation scheme due to Ichikawa et al. （CHES 2005）. Our evaluation method can be used in electronic design automatic （EDA） flows and can help security circuit designers to understand the data leakage due to SCAs.

关 键 词：computer security differential power attack side channel attack 

分 类 号：TP393.08[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术] P343.6[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]