投标者为风险规避型引入佣金的分析(二)  

Analysis of Commission on Auctions When Bidders Are Risk-averse

作　　者：肖海燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北第二师范学院数学与数量经济学院,湖北武汉430205

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2012年第3期362-364,共3页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：湖北省教育厅科学技术研究计划指导性基金资助项目

摘　　要：在投标者是风险规避型的情况下,考虑引入佣金对拍卖结果的影响,在关联价值模型中,对于密封一价拍卖和密封二价拍卖,佣金比例k越高投标者的报价越低,卖方的期望收益越低,拍卖行的期望收益越高,但投标者的期望效用与k无关。在对称独立私有价值模型中,当引入佣金时,收益等价性原理不成立,卖方在一价拍卖下的期望收益比在二价拍卖下的收益要高。This article considers the effect of commission on auctions when bidders are risk -averse. It can be found that the commission rate has effects on the bidders＇ bidding strategy, the expected revenue of the seller and the auctioneer. The bigger the commission rate is, the lower the bidder bids, and the less expected revenue the seller makes, but the more revenue the auctioneer has ,and the bidder＇s expected utility is not dependent on the commission rate. In the symmetry independent private value model which induced commission,the revenue - equivalence theorem is incorrect. The expected revenue in the first - price auction is greater than that in the second - price auction.

关 键 词：拍卖 风险规避 佣金 均衡期望效用 

分 类 号：F724.59[经济管理—产业经济]