二级密封价格机制工程招标模型  

Construction Engineering Auction Model Based on the Second Sealed Price Mechanism

作　　者：沈登民[1] 张云波[1] 章凌云[1] 张丽文[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学土木工程学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2012年第3期365-368,共4页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国务院侨办科研基金资助项目(06Q0052);福建省自然科学基金资助项目(E9910026)

摘　　要：利用博弈论和数理统计的方法建立了建筑市场二级密封价格招标模型,通过对投标人投标策略的分析,证明了在满足投标人独立个人工程成本估算、对称、投标人是风险中性的条件下,投标人最优的策略即为按其成本进行报价,招标的结果满足占优均衡;应用机制设计理论,证明二级密封价格招标中,参与投标的人数越多,工程的期望成交价格越趋近于最低的可能工程成本估价;最后通过一个案例验证了模型的合理性,为建筑工程招标投标机制的选择提供了依据,有利于建筑招标市场的健康发展。The second -price sealed auction model was set up by using the game theory and probability theory. Through the analysis of the biding strategies of the bidders, it shows that the optimal strategies is to let his bidding price equals to his estimated cost of the project ,when the bidders are restricted to rationality, independent private values and risk neutrality. And the bidding result meets the dominant equilibrium conditions. According to meehanism design theory, it proves that the more bidders partici- pate the auction, the more closeness between the expectation price and the lowest possible estimated cost. Finally an empirical a- nalysis was done to verify the reasonability of the model. Some foundations were provided to the auction mechanism design in con- struction field. The auction model is conducive to the healthy development of architectural biddinK market.

关 键 词：招投标 二级密封价格 博弈论 机制设计 

分 类 号：F724.59[经济管理—产业经济]