限购令下房地产市场的多方博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Multi-player under the Policy of Limiting Purchasing of Housing in Real Estate Market

作　　者：张丽文[1] 张云波[1] 沈登民[1] 贺勇[1] 方荣杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学土木工程学院,福建厦门361021

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2012年第3期387-389,共3页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国务院侨办科研基金资助项目(06Q0052);福建省自然科学基金资助项目(E9910026)

摘　　要：运用博弈论的基本知识,建立了中央政府与地方政府、地方政府与开发商之间的博弈模型,分析得出了各自的博弈均衡。提出中央政府和地方政府追究惩罚的威胁必须是可置信的,才可以通过合理的激励约束与惩罚机制,来改善调控,提高被动方执行限购令的积极性。With the game theory, supelvision game model between the central government and the local government was es- tablished. And game equilibriums were concluded. It was proposed that the punishment threaten of the central government and the local government should be believable promise. The proper incentive policy and penalty would then improve the enthusiasm of de- velopers in putting PLPH into practice.

关 键 词：房地产市场 博弈论 纳什均衡 限购令 

分 类 号：F293.3[经济管理—国民经济]