终极控制权、大股东制衡与信息披露质量  

ULTIMATE CONTROL RIGHT,BLOCKHOLDERS COUNTERBALANCE AND QUALITY OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE

作　　者：唐跃军[1] 左晶晶[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2012年第6期83-95,共13页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70802015)

摘　　要：本文从第二类代理问题和特殊资产保护出发,基于终极控制权,探讨控股股东和其他大股东以及大股东制衡机制对上市公司信息披露战略及信息披露质量的影响。实证研究表明:(1)虽然控股股东控制权比例越高的上市公司,信息披露显得越可靠和及时,但控股股东无意于提升信息披露的相关性。(2)控股股东现金流权比例越高,即其特殊资产卷入程度越高,越有可能卷入信息操纵。提高信息披露的可靠性和及时性,但同样无意于提升信息披露的相关性。(3)其他大股东可能阻碍控股股东操控信息披露,其他大股东持股比例越高,越有可能对信息披露以及信息披露的可靠性和及时性产生负面作用。(4)其他大股东制衡度与信息披露指数、信息披露可靠性和及时性之间表现为显著的U型关系。From the perspectives of type If agency problem and protection of specialized assets and based on the theory of ultimate control rights, this paper discussed the impacts of counterbalance mecha- nism of blockholders between controlling shareholders and other blockholders on information disclosure strategy and quality of Chinese listed companies. The empirical analysis indicated as following： （1） con- trolling shareholders with higher control rights were inclined to disclose apparently reliable and timely in- formation to delude the market and small investors, but had less motivation to improve the relevancy of in- formation disclosure; （2） controlling shareholders with higher cash flow rights or involvement of special- ized assets most probably manipulated information disclosure in order to enhance its reliability and timeli- ness, but bad less motivation to improve its relevancy; （3） other blockholders were inclined to counteract information manipulation by controlling shareholders, resulting in “negative impacts” on the reliability and timeliness of information disclosure; （4） it was significant U-shape between counterbalance degree of other blockholders and reliability and timeliness of information diselosure

关 键 词：终极控制权 大股东制衡 信息披露 第二类代理问题 特殊资产保护 治理 战略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F233F832.51