佣金约束条件下排污权双边叫价拍卖机制设计  

Research on Double Auction Model of Emissions Rights in the Restriction of Commission

作　　者：周朝民[1] 李寿德[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2012年第3期104-106,共3页Shanghai Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70873084)

摘　　要：通过排污权交易提高环境资源的使用效率和配置效率,实现环境资源最优配置。排污权和排污权市场理论研究是环境资源可持续利用的重要研究课题,而排污权交易模型是排污权市场理论与实践中排污权交易的核心。本文采用双边叫价拍卖交易模式,建立了排污权交易双边叫价拍卖的不完全信息博弈模型,给出了双边叫价拍卖的机制设计。该机制具有有效性和激励相容性。Double action model is adopted to determine the market price. In this auction, a seller and a buyer offer the asking price and bid price for a unit of emission permits, respectively. Then, the market price is determined. At the same time, we introduced the commission rate into the double action model. When the trade is agreed, both the seller and the buyer should burden the commission which is paid to the trade center. Based on the above assumptions, Game Model for carbon emission permits is established. The bidding strategy is determined in order to obtain the maximum profit for both seller and buyer.

关 键 词：排污权拍卖 双边叫价拍卖 佣金约束 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]