多再制造商回收定价竞争博弈  

A Non-cooperative Game on the Acquisition Pricing of Multiple Remanufacturers

作　　者：李响[1] 李勇建[2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济与社会发展研究院,天津300071 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2012年第2期72-76,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71002077;70971069;70772052);霍英东教育基金会资助项目(121078);南开大学2009年度人文社会科学校内文科青年资助项目(NKQ09027)

摘　　要：多个再制造商在同一回收市场中获取废旧产品并进行再制造,他们之间存在回收竞争。每个再制造商回收废旧产品的数量取决于自身付出的回收价格,同时和对手们的回收价格相关。目标是最大化各自的期望利润。本文首先利用优化理论和非合作博弈理论,证明了该博弈作为超模博弈,存在唯一的Nash均衡。然后通过比较发现竞争下的Nash均衡价格高于串谋下的合作均衡价格。最后通过数值仿真探讨了再制造商的数目和再制造成本对博弈的影响。Remanufacturing is an environmentally and economically sound way to process used products because it poses great opportunities for saving resources, improving productivity and reducing manufacturing costs. To realize these opportunities, acquiring the used product is regarded as the first step in the remanufacturing process. One widely adopted approach to collect used products is to utilize a market-driven channel by paying an acquisition price to end-users. This approach can help reduce the number of used products for remanufacturing. Moreover, the competition in the used product acquisition has been a prevailing phenomenon, especially when a number of remanufacturers produce same products and collect the used ones from end-users inthe same re,inn_

关 键 词：逆向物流 再制造 回收定价 博弈论 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]