地方官员激励和产权保护——基于企业微观数据的研究  

Incentives for Local Officials and Property Rights Protection:Evidence from Firm-level Data

作　　者：潘孝挺[1] 左翔[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学经济学院,上海200433 [2]上海对外贸易学院国际经贸学院,上海201620

出　　处：《财经研究》2012年第7期49-58,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：上海财经大学研究生创新基金(CXJJ-2010-336)的资助

摘　　要：文章利用世界银行的企业微观调查数据对地方官员激励与企业产权保护进行了实证研究。研究发现:(1)地方财政分权程度越高、当地市委书记的年龄小于55岁,企业所获得的产权保护水平越高,反之则越低。(2)地方官员激励机制对产权保护的作用在不同规模企业中具有结构性差异。具体而言,在财税剩余所得激励下,地方官员更倾向于保护大企业,而在一把手晋升激励下,地方官员则更倾向于保护小企业。这与不同规模的企业对经济总量和增速有不同的边际贡献率有关,地方官员在财税剩余所得激励下更关心经济总量,而在一把手晋升激励下则更关注经济增速。This paper empirically investigates the etiect of incentives for local officials on corporate property rights protection by using firmlevel data of the World Bank. It shows that higher degree of local fiscal decentralization and the fact that local municipal party committee secretary is younger than 55 years old lead to higher level of corporate property rights protection, and vice versa. The effects of incentives mechanisms for local officials on proper ty rights protection structurally differ in firms with different sizes. Specific ally speaking, owing to different marginal contribution of firms with different sizes to total economy output and economic growth rate, local officials are in clined to protect big firms under residual income tax incentives, while they tend to protect small firms under topleader promotion incentives. Local offieials pay more attention to total economic output under residual income tax incentives,while they put greater emphasis on economic growth rate under top-leader promotion incentives.

关 键 词：财税剩余所得激励 一把手晋升激励 企业产权保护水平 

分 类 号：F061.3[经济管理—政治经济学] F062.6