工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析  

Analysis on Performance and Evolution of Mass Stimulation under Project Quality Optimization

作　　者：李真[1] 孟庆峰[2] 盛昭瀚[3] 李迁[3] 

机构地区：[1]江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏镇江212003 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013 [3]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2012年第3期112-121,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(11&ZD169);"十一五"国家科技支撑计划重点项目(2011BAG07B05);国家自然科学基金重点项目(70831002);国家自然科学基金项目(70971061;71171099;71101069;71001028;71004049;71101067)

摘　　要：针对业主与多标段承包商群体的一对多结构,考虑业主如何通过单价合同与收益共享合同所组成的菜单合同模式对承包商群体进行激励以优化工程质量。本文构建了单阶段群体激励模型以及考虑承包商个体存在公平感知的多阶段群体激励模型,通过计算实验方法探讨不同报酬结构下的激励效率及其演化。研究表明:业主实行同一报酬结构在多阶段工程建设中难以维持高效率;单阶段激励中较好的报酬结构并不适用于多阶段激励过程;个体的公平感知对激励绩效会产生负面影响;报酬结构中针对不同质量标准的激励力度均会对激励效率产生影响,仅针对单一激励力度进行调整或忽视激励力度间的协同均不能实现较好的激励效果。In this paper,one owner and many contractors construction system is studied, in which the own- er uses menu contract, including unit price contract and revenue sharing contract, to stimulate contractors on project quality optimization and coordination. Two basic models are built up, one is single-stage incen- tive model and the other is multi-stage incentive model as contractors having fairness perceptions. Perform- ance and evolution under different compensation structures are also analyzed by computational experiment. Results show that： Any compensation structure can not maintain it＇s efficiency when it is executed in multi- stage incentives; Compensation structure performing well in single-stage model can not keep good perform- ance when applied to multi-stage incentive process; Individual fairness perception has negative influence on incentive performance; Every motivational factor in compensation structure has impact on incentive effi- ciency, and perfect incentive effect can not be achieved if cooperation among all incentive factors are ignored.

关 键 词：质量优化 群体激励 报酬结构 计算实验 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]