维权型群体性突发事件社会网络结构与策略的协同演化机制  

Co-evolutionary Mechanism of Social Network Structure and Strategy in Mass Emergency with Maintain Legal Rights

作　　者：刘德海[1,2] 王维国[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [2]东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2012年第3期185-192,共8页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70901016;71171035);全国教育科学规划专项研究课题(GLA102084);辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L11BGL007);广东省人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(09JDXM63012);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJC790029)

摘　　要：本文从社会网络分析角度揭示群体性突发事件的演化机理,建立了维权型群体性突发事件社会网络结构与策略的协同演化模型。首先,考虑变化的参与者心智模型和博弈环境,建立了五阶段动态博弈模型,在此基础上根据事态发展三个阶段讨论社会网络结构与策略协同演化机制;然后,根据弱势群体的社会网络拓扑特征,建立了维权型群体性突发事件社会网络结构与策略的协同演化模型,得出理性主义、利他主义和机会主义三种社会网络的最低抗议人数。研究表明:利他主义社会网络的最低临界人数较少,机会主义社会网络中核心组织成员需要承担更大的抗议成本。最后,Netlogo社会网络仿真分析和某住宅小区锅炉房扩建冲突的案例分析,验证了理论分析结果。The evolutionary mechanism of mass emergency with maintain legal rights is revealed from the viewpoint of social network, and co-evolutionary model of social network structure and strategy is built in this study. Firstly, considering the changing of player＇s mental model and game environment, the five- phase dynamic game model is built. And then the co-evolutionary model of social network structure and strategy is discussed based on the three phases developing course. Secondly, the co-evolutionary model of social network structure and strategy is built according to the social network characteristics of vulnerable group. The minimum number of protesters is obtained in the rational social network, altruism social net- work and opportunism social network. It is shown that there is less minimum number of protesters in the altruism social network, and the core members need undertake the higher protest cost in the opportunism social network. Lastly, the theoretical results are validated by the Netlogo social network simulation and a case study of boiler room enlargement in some residential district.

关 键 词：群体性突发事件 协同演化 社会网络分析 Netlogo仿真 应急管理 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]